Law, especially from the international human rights regime, is a direct reference on which minority groups rely when it comes to 'non-discrimination'. Drawing upon LGBT rights in Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore, this paperthrough an application of K.H. Chen's (2010) Asia as method -critically reviews how global LGBT politics interact with local societies influenced by Confucianism. Along a perpetual competition between the universalism and cultural relativism of human rights, this paper not only identifies the pitfalls of 'Asian values' from a cosmopolitan perspective but also contributes to a queered approach to human rights-holders against homonationalism.
Introduction
Exploring possible interpretations of human rights is often undertaken to counter power relations between people and government as well as the marginalised and society. In particular, in terms of equality and non-discrimination, international human rights legal norms are the most salient and direct reference on which opponents of LGBT rights rely. Law presents itself as an institution and dominates social life, which is 'created, interpreted, and enforced in certain socially established ways, through the use of Submission for The International Journal of Human Rights subaltern culture therein. The LGBT social movement in Taiwan faces an internal contradiction derived from the conflicting notions of sexual liberation and homonormativity. Following a debate between legal positivism and critical theories, the movement may have fallen into a trap left by the Euro-American path to modernity. 11 After dealing with the question of law from a cultural perspective, this paper then turns to focus on discursivities of human rights in Confucian Asia, especially on the intense competition between universalism and cultural relativism. 12 In this regard, several factors driven within the society and from the external world are identified, especially the rise of the Taiwan independence movement and the relationship with China in the post-Cold War era. The former, which constructs a fictive ethnicity, has played a key role in naturalising sexual deviance, as queer Marxism has developed as a historical response to Chinese Marxism (Maoism). 13 As the counterpart of Taiwan, people in urban China are actually more individualistic and independent, in terms of kinship, from their families, which is reflected in their coming out process, 14 since contemporary urban China no longer has as much of a Confucian bond as other places in East Asia.
Besides a larger territory, the tendency for migrant employment, and urbanisation, one key reason could be that China experienced a cultural revolution when
Marxism-Leninism displaced all of the traditional teachings in the 1960s and 1970s. 15 It is too arbitrary to thus call China's society deconstructionist, but we may see how the
LGBT social movement has developed in urban China so differently from in other places, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, where activists encounter more conflicts in identity politics between neoliberalist and paternalist styles. Concluding with a revisitation of the relationship between legal reform and social change, this paper not only demonstrates how to apply 'Asia as method' to studying LGBT rights, by
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taking Taiwan as an example, from a socio-legal perspective, it also presents the pitfalls of the so-called 'Asian values' that have otherwise caused the collapse of the cultural legitimacy and personal subjectivity of 'Asian beings'.
Contouring LGBT rights as human rights along Confucius societies
A hegemony in constructing sexuality and gender was displayed in the history of different cultures until the 1980s, when relevant discourses were shaped by the globalisation of heterosexism and homophobia, on the one hand, as well as identity and diversity on the other. 16 In the vein of the social movement in East Asia, the normative distinction between civil society and state power is however, too simplistic, as it ignores the experience in this area in which civil society has often been subordinated to the state and social struggles have mostly been excluded from both spheres. Setting aside the rights discourse, which also came from the 'West,' 17 this paper also discusses an additional sphere of min-jian -people's sphere as a space for political society, which does not belong to the state or the civil society of elites -in the Renaissance of Confucianism in East Asia. Since it is important to identify causations in contextualising the social construction located in history, Chen argues that the sphere of min-jian should be a priority in East Asian socio-political analysis.
Chen develops this term out of a tension -shared by many East Asian languages that share Chinese terminology -between officialdom (Kwan) and a people's space, in which subaltern struggles are relatively autonomous from the dominant institutions of the state and the civil society of elites, although the latter may appropriate these struggles as part of a project of emancipation. However, this political society of minjian, as a site of engagement, cannot be reduced to a fixed point within the state and civil society, for it often contributes to modifying established relations of power and interest and positioning societal needs, for example new interpretations of gender and 20 Taiwan has never had a sodomy taboo in law, even when it was under Japanese rule.
Just like traditional Chinese culture, Japanese culture did not historically conceive of a 'normative connection between gender and sexual preferences because all men, whether samurai, priest, or commoner, were able to engage in both same-and opposite-sex affairs'. 21 Male homoeroticism in traditional Japan was often an expression and extension of one's social power, but such gender inequality made society turn a blind eye to lesbianism as the focus was simply on 'men'. The Taiwanese were more fortunate than the Japanese as they witnessed the rise of feminism and women's right LGBT rights in Singapore since the Muslim population is more negative with regard to issues of homosexuality and gender disconformity. As for Hong Kong, the complexities rest more on the relationship between the Hong Kong government (Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), led by the Chief Executive, who is in principle appointed by the PRC's Central People's Government, and China. In short, the closer the relationship between these two governments, the more resistant and mobilised the people are.
Although the people's political sphere in China might be more tolerant (or indifferent) and dynamic (or pluralistic) than it appears to outsiders at first glance, the Chinese government poses as conservative in global LGBT politics and this has stimulated the civic force from the min-jian of Hong Kong against the official attitude of China. Nonetheless, the juxtaposition of former colonial rule, traditional Chinese customs, a multicultural context, and the intention of the Chinese government has make
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Hongkongers 'schizophrenic' between pro and against sexual dissidents, which in turn has generated conflicting views on these topics. 27 Unlike the Judeo-Christian tradition, which is well 'transplanted' into the lay culture of Hong Kong and Singapore, the Protestants and Catholics in Taiwan represent the bourgeoisie and wealthier class, which have a great influence on politics. This reveals a twisted version of democracy, which has been criticised, 28 and marriage equality in Taiwan remains largely a dream because of a lack of legal recognition despite the majority of the population's social acceptance.
As globalisation implies universalisation versus particularisation, which creates similarities or reinforces distinctions across societies, an increasing cross-reference of law and social science happens to identify the impetus and dynamic of social change. 29 One group of researchers undertook an international survey on the key factors of gayunfriendliness, although it did not intend to be exhaustive. 30 The factors are: (1) the type of legal system, 31 (2) the democratic conditions and political opportunity for the minority population, 32 (3) the state of economic development and modernisation, 33 and (4) the level of globalisation. 34 These factors may explain the legal attitude towards the gay and lesbian population. For instance, Singapore, with the least respect and equality for homosexual people among the three, has a sizable Catholic and Muslim population and less democratic freedoms in the public sphere, and its legal system is based on the English common law system, although it is unquestionably one of the richest countries in the world and highly exposed to globalisation. 35 However, this predication is not accurate enough, for there are more variables that a Western synthesis may not properly capture regarding the whole picture in East Asia. 36 In China, before the decriminalisation and demedicalisation of homosexuality respectively in 1997 and 2001, homosexuality was viewed as 'a sign of bourgeois 41 and that symbolic meanings and cultural capital deserve a reflexive critique of the perceived modernity in such a field. 42 In order to systemise a pursuit for justice that law attempts to generalise and conceptualise interpersonal relations, actions and circumstances in abstract terms, this paper is naturally aiming for an implicit and indirect evaluation of the virtues or defects of social reality per se. 43 Similarly in Taiwan, it is, in the form of 'traditional culture', argued vehemently by people from the church. Most dramatically, they all claim that such a social movement, coming from the 'West', is as radical as raping public opinion.
Held by anti-cultural imperialists, cultural relativism and legal passivism are prevalent at the moment against internationalism and the universality of human rights, whenever issues are brought by the 'West' such as gender and sexuality, 49 59 Since the issue around LGBT rights has triggered controversies regarding the state paternalism and individual politics on a global plane, 60 intensive attention to linking sexuality and human rights provokes a paradigmatic debate that pertains to two dimensions of the human rights discourse. Primarily, the presumption of universal entitlement to human rights concerns the inclusion, or not, of sexual and gender minorities for full protection under international human rights law. Furthermore, the requirement for international monitoring of the implementation of a globally accepted minimum standard involves the legitimacy of difference in respecting freedoms and satisfying rights.
Core to both dimensions is cultural relativism, which is basically based on multiculturalism, contending that all cultural values must have equal status and any attempt to uphold mainstream ideologies over others is a form of prejudice. 61 However, states that consider universalism to be cultural imperialism do not substantially respect
cultural diversity under their jurisdictions. This paper attempts to discuss the essence of the universality of human rights in response to the Asian values and homonationalism, which concerns a fear of neo-imperialism in the name of liberal democracy brought by the global LGBT social movement. 62 Human rights advocates should never avoid the question of how to define humanity and justice in terms of 'rights', 63 if we consider that human rights are the rights that one has simply as a human being, although the idea of 'being' is very essentialist and rests on human reason and consciousness. 64 Although international human rights law enshrines the principle of equality and the inalienability of human dignity and fundamental freedoms, a legal positivist view reading the text of multilateral treaties does not help explain how law interacts with the natural subject in terms of sex or gender issues. In whichever form, norms, even those of international human rights protection, perform to institutionalise the dualism or binarism in an organised hierarchy, regardless of whether or not they intend to liberate the subordinate (the other) from the dominant (the normal), for 'there is no natural who precedes representation in law. Instead, legal texts and practices constitute the subjects of law, playing a particularly powerful role in the processes that reproduce and naturalise dominant social norms and practices'. 65 Genealogically, the international human rights discourse was born out of all nations' opinio necessitatis derived from people's great fear of oppression and depreciation and huge desire for peace and liberty after both World Wars.
We may not forget how the international community unprecedentedly reached a strong consensus over some 'absolute values' subject to no derogation since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 66 and the unanimous adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 67 We may envisage that the episteme of international human rights was pragmatically desired for the conscience of
humanity, 68 although 'individuals, groups, and even public authorities often not merely recognize but legitimately act upon differences between groups of people'. 69 Eventually, the non-discrimination principle only prohibits illegitimate distinction that deprives target groups of the full enjoyment of rights. That is to say, discrimination that is absolutely wrongful is constituted when it has dehumanised individual subjectivity and thus undermines social justice. 70 For those who used to be systematically treated as less than full rights holders within a given political community, being listed for guaranteed protection explicitly in law is like a stamp recording their successful struggles.
In other words, before additional forms of discrimination become recognised as unjustifiable and considered as prohibited grounds, the room given by 'other status' 71 can provisionally be capable of carrying political and legal forces to combat the unbearable stigmatisation. With regard to LGBT rights, the 2011 OHCHR report documented discriminatory legislations and practices as well as acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity throughout the world.
In addition to direct threats from social normalisation, judicial correction and medical institutionalisation, restrictions on a wide range of other rights have also been enacted to indirectly interfere with people's freedoms and autonomy. The most frustrating fact is that LGBT individuals and other sexual and gender minorities are denied by law and reality in some countries, and are still subject to civil disabilities and social prejudices.
The response based on the universality of human rights is thus intended to answer the question of whether such social attitude can justify the continued exclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity from the prohibited grounds of discrimination.
Opponents of homosexuality and transgenderism may refer to the law of nature (or preferably God), but they neglect the fact that 'nature' has never been a concern of Submission for The International Journal of Human Rights egalitarianism. Although Foucault, Butler, 72 and many other critical theorists all argue that sexuality, sexual orientation, gender binarism, transsexuality, and all of our perceptions of sex and body are socially constructed, this should not affect whether or not people who are not cisgender or heteronormative should be respected since we also accept that religion, language and ethnicity should not be the basis for illegitimate discrimination. Moreover, most, if not all, of the groups of people who are particularly recognised as entitled to non-discrimination from the dominant population and public authority were once seen as a threat to public morals.
Donnelly has properly concluded that pseudo-speciation leading to dehumanising other cultural groups lends itself to being most immoral. 73 In reality, the current stance against perverts taken by homo/transphobic countries is based on the same logic that Americans and Europeans used to justify their mistreatment of Africans and Asians in the 1950s. As we can see, public morality itself is fluid and defined by contingency instead of justice. Furthermore, even though we accept that voluntary sexual relations among same sex people and alternation of gender roles contrary to people's biological sex are a profound moral outrage, discrimination against LGBT individuals cannot be justified from a human rights perspective. 74 Those sexual and gender minorities, in the light of the universal possession of rights, are still entitled to equal protection before the law at any rate. In response to neo-conservatism, Donnelly argues that cultural relativism is simply a way for societies to believe that their values are binding although they just happen to be widely practised within a particular context. assertion has ignored the contingency and changing character of a culture -a repertoire of unstructured entities and contested symbols -over which members of a society constantly struggle. 77 Therefore, Donnelly's relative universality of human rights does not consider that the universal possession of human rights is philosophically challenged, but he admits that there can be varying practices to satisfy the needs of human rights holders. In terms of the LGBT social movement, it is uncontested that every part of the world has its own path to progressively accepting a changing norm in law and society and does not necessarily follow the Euro-American model, as long as the subjectivity and enfranchisement of 'being' the rights-holders is not deliberately denied nor degraded.
What non-Western governments fear most, with regard to homonationalism, is ideological colonialisation by means of victimising and politicising minorities'
identities. 78 Donnelly also warns of the political danger posited by 'excessive' or twisted universalism, especially when a powerful actor mistakes its own interests for universal values. 79 Beyond multiculturalism, the relative universality of human rights, based on the cultural pluralism, applies more to cosmopolitan 'beings' in sociopolitical-legal contexts. 80 In Plummer's new work on Cosmopolitan Sexualities, 81 he also urges, besides the recognition of the multiplicities of genders and sexualities, the identification of common virtues among all peoples of different cultures. He considers a more inclusive approach, based on human norms, for the next step of comparing and persuading each other, and this sheds light precisely on global ethics, in which justice and rights are well-founded, at least in the aftermath of the Second World War.
As for 'Asia as method', a process producing reflexivity of colonial legacy is important. It not only demands that Westerners show special caution and sensitivity when promoting a new rights discourse but also permits that non-Westerners -Asian
beings in this case -to remould the imported idea carefully in a sense of respecting, rather than undermining, the core value of human dignity. 82 As applied, cultural differences should not serve for 'denial' or exaggeration of the Cold War; 83 instead, they are indicators of seeking for the commons. In essence, everyone is entitled to life, health, privacy and security, although sexual orientation or gender identity is not yet explicitly included in the prohibited grounds of discrimination. If a state refuses to protect anyone against violence in the name of cultural conservativism, it is still violating the basic human rights (or in any other form of an accepted discourse concerning such entitlements) of the victims. 84 The core values of human rights are inherently embraced by all human beings regardless of where they are from.
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Conclusion
Although the UK has repealed sodomy law, it is ironic that Singapore, with an antiimperial stance, 86 contends that homosexual acts are still punishable since gay rights are simply a 'Western' issue. If 'Asia as method' sustains, a legitimate process of decolonisation in Singapore, rather than defending the law, should deliberate upon the purpose and function of law that is a colonial product and the meaning of its existence.
From the stand point of an Asian being, it is a process of deconstructing an imperialised ideology that remains today to reconstructing or recovering the community's own values; otherwise people living in former colonies will always be trapped by the pitfalls of colonialism. If we consider that colonisation is a result of suppression and oppression, then a decolonisation process should at least have liberation and emancipation as its critical force, 87 as Spivak cautioned against ignoring subaltern perople as cultural Others by means of epistemic violence. 88 The principle of non-discrimination, which aims to protect individuals qua world citizens, requires remedying inequalities that resulted from illegitimate power relations although it has been repackaged with another descriptor 'rainbowing' for Taiwanese.
The latter attempts to deconstruct the symbolic signifiers with regard to gender and sexuality and has been borrowed to legitimise all of the marginalised groups in society, whereas the former tries to de-radicalise the sexuality-centred movement because many LGBT Taiwanese would still rather stay invisible. Such a mild approach manifests a relatively non-aggressive struggle through performing in the private sphere and changing people's lifestyles, 91 as min-jian politics versus civil society. Despite the insistence on various sexual identities, the rainbow coalition in Taiwan, which encompasses all kinds of civil rights movements, 92 does not intend to play the criticism but to evade it, because it believes that 'as cultures change, so do sexualities, sexuality for humans is profoundly not like that of other animals. Everywhere it is prone to shifting symbols, contingent contexts and political processes.' 93 The rainbow coalition, besides launching a marriage equality initiative and holding the biggest Pride in East Asia, also looks to replace legislators who have been identified as homo/transphobic or ignorant of minority rights by voting.
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Out of fear of facing great opposition from the neo-conservatists, who are mostly religious bourgeoisies, the Ministry of Justice intends to disregard all of the efforts on the work of same-sex partnerships, disregarding the recommendations made by the human rights experts in 2013 that human rights protection should not be subject to public opinion. This has not only undermined the fundamental value of a 'Human Rights State' 94 but also harmed the developing Taiwaneseness, which was once consolidated by being liberated from authoritarianism. 95 In fact, similar hot debates over legalising same-sex marriage are also taking place in many other East Asian countriesfor example, Vietnam, 96 Thailand, 97 South Korea, 98 and Japan. 99 Playing a pioneer role for Taiwan in creating a truly democratic society is what the Taiwanese are always proud of so as to distinguish themselves from the Mainland Chinese, and fortunately
Taiwan is still referred to as the most LGBT-friendly country in Asia. 100 Such an open attitude of min-jian politics caused rainbow power to reach its peak in influencing the voters at Taiwan's largest-scale local elections in November 2014 by scoring candidates on a scale from the most LGBT-friendly to LGBT-phobic 101 -that has also encouraged many LGBT candidates running campaigns for the 2016 parliamentary election. For many who support the symbolic 'rainbow', human diversity rather than particularity falls much within the Confucius notion of collectivism in Taiwan; it is a cosmopolitan approach to coexistence, different from Singapore's multiculturalist approach. The key strategy is all about fighting against the neoconservatists, masked as the traditional orthodox, and stimulating social change by means of emancipation and inclusion at the same time. 102 From this paper, we can see that doing legal research per se on LGBT rights can inevitably involve a critical study of culture, especially when minority interests are not yet the primary concern of Submission for The International Journal of Human Rights mainstream society and the power relations that structure epistemic violence between the middle class and others still exist.
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